Executive Summary
What the scan proved
Start with the thesis and highlighted findings, then move into the full findings inventory and supporting threat model.
Why this matters
Kuzushi Security's automated scan of Ligolo-ng, a widely-used offensive network tunneling tool, uncovered 27 true positive findings across 10 scanner strategies — including critical race conditions that crash the agent process, absent mutual authentication between proxy and agent enabling session hijacking, and default credentials on the Web API — demonstrating fundamental security gaps in a tool deployed across red team operations worldwide.
Featured findings
Scan parameters
Low-frequency methodology and run configuration details.
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Scan parameters
Low-frequency methodology and run configuration details.
| Strategies | semgrep, codeql, threat-hunt, threat-model-randori, agentic, auth-logic-detect, race-condition-detect, supply-chain-detect, taint-iris, security-misconfig-detect |
| Model | claude-sonnet-4-6 |
| Severity | error, warning, info |
| Verify | Yes |
| Branch | HEAD |
Findings
Primary findings workspace
Keep the inventory visible first. Open a finding for evidence, verification, and remediation detail when it becomes the next question.
Finding inventory (27 of 71)
Severity filtering stays close to the primary list, with deeper analysis tools tucked below.
Analysis tools
Treemap, severity mix, verdict mix, and strategy heatmap live here when you need deeper pattern analysis.
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Analysis tools
Treemap, severity mix, verdict mix, and strategy heatmap live here when you need deeper pattern analysis.
Vulnerability Heatmap
22 files · sized by finding count · colored by severityBy Severity
By Verdict
Strategy x Severity
Click a cell to filterThreat Model
Threat model workspace
Use the PASTA flow as the primary walkthrough. Supporting inventory and deeper intelligence stay below it so only one major view competes for attention at a time.
7-Step PASTA Threat Model
Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis — a risk-centric methodology mapping business objectives through attack simulation to prioritized remediation.
System decomposition — objectives, components, trust boundaries, and data flows.
Maps business-critical objectives for Ligolo-ng's encrypted tunneling and multi-hop relay operations.
Supporting inventory
Actors, components, and data flows that back the threat model.
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Supporting inventory
Actors, components, and data flows that back the threat model.
Supporting Model Data
| Actor | Type | Trust |
|---|---|---|
| Red Team Operator | human | fully trusted |
| Ligolo-ng Agent | automated_process | trusted within channel |
| Internal Network Host (Target) | external_system | untrusted |
| Downstream Relay Agent | automated_process | trusted within channel |
| Web API Client (Browser / Script) | human_or_automated | trusted after auth |
| Unauthenticated Network Attacker | threat_actor | untrusted |
| Rogue / Hijacked Agent | threat_actor | untrusted |
Supporting attack-path network
Open the actor network only when you need the broader relationship map beyond the primary attack graph.
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Supporting attack-path network
Open the actor network only when you need the broader relationship map beyond the primary attack graph.
Compliance
Compliance posture
Review the mapped control gaps after you understand the findings and threat model context.
Control Coverage by Family
Priority Gaps
No RBAC implementation; No privilege separation between read and write operations; No per-agent access restrictions
No data masking on API responses; Secrets in plaintext config file; No field-level access control on sensitive data
CLI history records target network information; No DLP controls on log output; Agent info packets expose full network topology
No secure deletion of private keys after session end; No data retention policy for logs or history; No cleanup mechanism for cached certificates
No unauthenticated health check endpoint; No metrics collection (Prometheus, StatsD, etc.); No anomaly detection for agent patterns; No alerting framework
No privilege levels; No read-only access mode; No per-agent access scoping
Log files with default permissions; No log integrity verification; No tamper detection
No health check endpoint; No metrics collection; No anomaly detection; No alerting
No SAST in CI; No dependency scanning; No dependabot/renovate
Control Assessment Matrix
| Control | Title | Standard | Status | Maturity | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A.8.5 | Secure authentication | ISO | Partial | 3/5 | 3 |
| A.8.2 | Privileged access rights | ISO | Not Implemented | 1/5 | 1 |
| A.8.3 | Information access restriction | ISO | Partial | 2/5 | — |
| A.8.24 | Use of cryptography | ISO | Partial | 3/5 | 3 |
| A.8.21 | Security of network services | ISO | Partial | 2/5 | 4 |
| A.8.11 | Data masking | ISO | Not Implemented | 1/5 | 2 |
| A.8.12 | Data leakage prevention | ISO | Not Implemented | 1/5 | 1 |
| A.8.10 | Information deletion | ISO | Not Implemented | 1/5 | — |
| A.5.14 | Information transfer | ISO | Partial | 3/5 | 1 |
| A.8.15 | Logging | ISO | Partial | 2/5 | 2 |
| A.8.16 | Monitoring activities | ISO | Not Implemented | 1/5 | — |
| A.8.28 | Secure coding | ISO | Partial | 2/5 | 2 |
Cross-Standard Mappings
| ISO 27001 | NIST 800-53 | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
| A.8.5 | IA-2 | equivalent |
| A.8.2 | AC-6 | equivalent |
| A.8.3 | AC-3 | equivalent |
| A.8.24 | SC-13 | equivalent |
| A.8.21 | SC-7 | equivalent |
| A.8.15 | AU-2 | equivalent |
| A.8.11 | SC-28 | equivalent |
| A.8.12 | SC-28 | equivalent |
| A.8.28 | SI-10 | equivalent |
| A.8.16 | SI-4 | equivalent |
| A.8.10 | MP-6 | equivalent |
| A.5.14 | SC-8 | equivalent |